Obama’s Plan against ISIS:
A Fundamental Solution
Or
A New Pandora’s Box
In the Middle East!
Written by: M. Sirani
25.09.2014
- Introduction:
Finally, in a
short televised speech to the nation, President Obama unveiled the US strategic plan against the Islamic State in Iraq
and Syria (ISIS). As Mr. Obama outlined, the U.S.
would lead a broad coalition in order to degrade and finally destroy ISIS in a comprehensive and sustained manner in the next
coming years. The plan, which consists of four important points, can be
summarized as follows: 1- Conducting systematic air strikes on ISIS facility
and structure, wherever they are, i.e. in Iraq
as well as in Syria.
2- Increasing support in the forms of equipment, training, and intelligence assistance
to the Iraqi military forces, Kurdish Pishmerga and the moderate Syrian
opposition, who are fighting ISIS on the ground. 3- Cutting off ISIS funding
from overseas donors, preventing foreign fighters joining ISIS
and improving intelligence capability in these matters. 4- Providing
humanitarian assistance to the innocent Iraqi and Syrian people (Whitehouse,
2014).
There is no
doubt that ISIS is one of the most dangerous,
savage and brutal terrorist groups in our lifetime. The atrocity of this group
in terms of terrorizing, mass killing, beheading, and raping the innocent people
is beyond the imagination of every human being. These barbaric and uncivilized
characteristics indicate the fact that a terrorist group such as ISIS and alike should be degraded and destroyed in every
parts of the world in an appropriate, comprehensive and fundamental manner. The
issue raises an important question. Would Obama’s plan be able to achieve such an
objective? At the first glance, Obama’s plan might seem as an effective, legitimate
and appropriate solution in this matter. But a deeper analysis reveals
something else, which indicates that this plan not only might not achieve its
main objective in a successful and comprehensive manner, instead it might open
a new Pandora’s Box probably beyond the borders of Iraq
and Syria.
In this respect, some important considerations are in order.
1- Effectiveness:
The first important
point is a serious doubt about the effectiveness of Obama’s plan. A brief
overview shows that there is nothing new and special about this plan. In fact,
there are massive similarities between Obama’s plan and the old policy of the U.S. and its allies in the Middle East and North Africa, since many years ago particularly from
1990s onwards. Since then and through all those years up until this moment in
various occasions: A- the U.S. and its allies (whether some members of the EU
or the Arab League or a type of combination of both groups) have been
conducting broad military operation including air strikes, whether by military
airplanes or drones, or surface-to-surface missile strikes against different Islamic
radical groups such as Taliban, Al- Qaeda, Al-Shebab, Boko Haram and their
affiliates in various parts of the Middle East and North Africa; B- the U.S.
and its allies have been supporting different political systems or groups in
various forms in their struggle against the Islamic radical groups. The only
difference between Obama’s plan and the previous U.S.
policy is the notion that in Obama’s plan the American ground forces will not
participate in any combat mission neither in Iraq
nor in Syria.
At this point, we should ask ourselves some simple questions. What was the
outcome of all those types of policies? Did implementation of those policies
manage to completely defeat and destroy the wave of Islamic extremism across
the Middle East and North Africa? The answer
to these questions is clearly negative. Those policies, in fact, not only did
not eliminate the wave of Islamic radicalism, instead, it has spread it in
different parts of Asia, the Middle East and North Africa
in a broader scale and much more aggressive manners. So, when the previous
policies did not achieve any effective and fundamental result in this matter,
will the current Obama’s plan succeed?
In this respect
an important point should be all over again mentioned. Islamic radicalism and
Islamic terrorist groups will not be fundamentally defeated and destroyed by
military operation alone; due to the fact that such a battle is an ideological
war. In an ideological war, military tool is just one tool among many other
necessary tools. As it appears, this important and vital point is not included
in Obama’s plan.
2- Legality:
Performing a
plan like this by any state should have a legal foundation based on the current
international law and convention. The existence of a legal foundation would
give legitimacy and justifiability to a plan in the domestic as well as
international arena. So is the case of President Obama’s plan. Although, the President
and his administration prefer to use the term “Systematic Counter Terrorism
Strategy” instead of war, in reality the President is waging a new war in the
Middle East; this time under the name of “War against ISIS”. Regarding the
conducting military operation in Iraq
according to this plan, we might close our eyes and simply argue that the Iraqi
government itself has requested U.S.
military assistance in its fight against ISIS;
although, there are many ambiguities in this matter as well. However, the plan would
become controversial, when we hear that the other part of this military
operation will be conducted against ISIS structure
within the Syrian territory, as the President himself stated. Regarding the
legality and legitimacy of this war based on the international law and
convention, the Obama administration faces a serious question as follows. Is
this a preemptive war or a preventive war? According to the international law
and convention:
“Preemptive
war is a “war of necessity” based on credible evidence of imminent attack
against which is justified under international law as enshrined in the
self-defense clause (Article 51) of the UN Charter.,,,,, Preventive wars are
essentially “wars of choice” that derive mostly from a calculus of power, rather
than the precedent of international law, convention and practices. In choosing
preventive wars, policymakers project that waging a war, even if unprovoked
against a rising adversary sooner is preferable to an inevitable war later when
the balance of power no longer rests in their favor” (cfr, 2004).
Based on the
definitions noted above, the Obama administration has two options with regard
to this question. The administration might claim that this is a preemptive war.
In this case, the U.S.
government should reveal some reliable, credible and verifiable evidence, which
proves that either ISIS or the Syrian Regime have planned an imminent attack
within the American soil and territory. Moreover, the U.S. authority
needs an approval by the UN, due to the fact that according to the
international law, preemptive war is not permitted, unless it is authorized by
the UN Security Council. Regarding this issue, some American policy makers claim
that ISIS is planning to enter the U.S.
via Mexico
in order to conduct a terrorist attack; but there is no credible and reliable
evidence, which confirms this allegation. As such, the door of using this
option in an internationally legal manner is closed to the Obama administration
(cfr, 2004).
The other option
for the administration is a claim that this is a preventive war, based on some credible
reason and evidence that the U.S.
would reveal. I leave aside these reasons and evidences in terms of credibility,
reliability and verifiability, although this issue plays an important role in
this matter as well. Instead, I focus on one of the important requirements of
waging a “preventive war” based on the international law and convention. Under
the framework of the modern international law, a preventive war should be
approved and authorized by the United Nations; otherwise, it is illegal and
illegitimate. This means, simply, that the Obama administration would need the
UN approval and authorization, in order to conduct this military operation in a
legal and legitimate manner. Given the fact that part of this military
operation will be conducted within the Syrian territory along with the
repeatedly claims of the U.S. authority and its allies that they will not
pursue any coordination and cooperation with Assad’s regime in this matter, the
U.S. will face another deadlock within the United Nation Security Council. In
this respect, Russia and
probably China
will likely veto any resolution to approve this operation within the Syrian
territory. As briefly explored above, the Obama administration would face a
dead-end alley in the both scenarios based on the current international law and
convention (cfr, 2004).
Such a barrier
and limitation has put the Obama administration in a difficult position. As
such, the President has decided to ignore the international law in this matter
and follow the path of his predecessor president George W. Bush by using “the
2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force” (AUMF). This resolution was
developed and enacted during the presidency of George W. Bush in response to
the 9/11, Al-Qaeda attacks on the U.S. soil. By enacting the 2001 AUMF,
the U.S. Congress granted a full authority to then- President George W. Bush to:
“use all necessary and appropriate force
against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned,
authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on
September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts
of international terrorism against the United States by such nations,
organizations or persons” (Vox, 20014).
As it appears,
the U.S. administration has
decided to use the 2001 AUMF resolution as a legal and legitimate foundation
for Obama’s plan by arguing that there are strong evidences that ISIS has
affiliated with Al-Qaeda in Iraq
in 2004 and later the group has been supported by some members and factions within
Al-Qaeda-aligned circles. This argument might satisfy the Obama administration,
some part of the public opinion and the politicians, whether within the USA or abroad,
but in reality is neither internationally legal, nor legitimate. Due to the
fact, that many individual members, factions within Al-Qaeda and some other
Islamic terrorist groups affiliated with Al-Qaeda have spread around the world
following the two invasions of the U.S. in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003). Some
of these individuals, factions and groups have moved to other countries
particularly in the Middle East and North Africa.
In this case and based on the 2001 AUMF, does the U.S. government have an unlimited
and endless authorization to strike, whenever/wherever it wants in all these
countries? Is this a reasonable, logical, legal and justifiable argument for
performing such a plan? (Vox, 2014).
From this, we
can deduce that Obama’s plan is a clear violation of the international law and
convention. By performing this plan, in fact, President Obama is unfortunately
adding his name alongside the names of some previous politicians such as
President George W. Bush and Mr. Tony Blair in the murky list of our history. It is or i might say it was an option, which
could save President Obama from these dilemmas. The president could, firstly,
cancel the military operation, at least temporarily, within the Syrian
territory; although, I’m fully aware that the head of this snake i.e. ISIS lies
in Syria and its tail is in Iraq
or vice versa. He could, secondly, refer this case to the United Nations
Security Council and use R2P program (Responsibility to Protect) for performing
his plan against ISIS in an internationally
legal and legitimate manner. It’s
unfortunately too late for such an approach. In addition, an announcement about
the cancelation of military operation in Syria
would be equivalent to a political suicide not only for President Obama but
also for the United State of America in the both domestic as
well as international arena at this stage. In case of such an announcement, the
reaction of President Obama would be similar to the event of latest chemical
attack in Syria, which took
place on 21.08.2013; when in the beginning, the President decided to attack Syria,
but later he canceled it. Should this happen, the President would enormously
lose his credibility among its allies abroad particularly among those Arab
states that so far have joined this coalition, in a hope to defeat and remove
Bashar Assad from the power in the final stage of this operation. Such a move
would, in addition, give an opportunity to the Republican Party to damage the
reputation of President Obama and the Democratic Party in the domestic arena.
To put it simply, President Obama has unfortunately reached the point of no
return in this matter.
3- Complications and Possible Side Effects of Obama’s Plan:
Based on what
has been revealed by the U.S.
officials (e.g. Mr. John Kerry and General Martin Dempsey) so far, Obama’s plan
is pursuing particular short and long term objectives in both Iraq and Syria. In order to achieve these
objectives, a coalition of different countries led by the U.S. has been
built. Among these countries France,
Australia
and ten Arab States could be mentioned. When it comes to Iraq, the plan is
supposed to achieve some goals including: 1- The formation of a “Unity”,
inclusive, independent and sustainable political system in Iraq, which would be
able to meet the demands and will of three Shiite, Sunni and Kurdish groups
within the country in a fair, equal and sustained manner in the short and long
term, 2- Reorganizing, training and equipping the Iraqi military and security
forces in the long term in a sense that these entities would be able to defend
the country against any internal and external threats, and 3- Attacking ISIS
facility and structure in Iraq in order to fundamentally defeat and destroy
this terrorist group in the country (C-Span, 2014).
When it comes to
Syria,
the plan consists of two short and long term efforts as well. In the short
term, the forces of some members of the coalition led by the U.S. would launch air strikes against ISIS facility within the Syrian territory in order to
defeat and destroy this terrorist group. In the long term, the coalition would organize,
train, arm, and equip the so-called Moderate Syrian Opposition in order to gradually
change the face of civil war in Syria
in the benefit of the Moderate Opposition. It may not be obvious at this stage,
but Obama’s plan would probably face a series of obstacles and complications in
both countries somewhere in the future. The combination of these difficulties
would inevitably undermine the level of success and effectiveness of Obama’s
plan to a large degree. Here below, some of these obstacles and their
consequences will be discussed (JCS, 2014).
3-1- The first important issue to
mention is the range of many heterogeneous state and non-state actors that would
be inevitably involved in this operation. This involvement might be in the form
of either intentionally or unintentionally or directly or indirectly. At the
present time, these heterogeneous actors can be divided into two main camps in
both countries of Iraq and Syria. The
first camp belongs to the U.S.,
its coalition, some Sunni groups within Iraq and the Moderate Syrian
opposition. The second camp belongs to Iran
(IRGC, Quds forces), its Shiite affiliates in Iraq
(such as the Mahdi Army), Assad’s Regime, Hezbollah and Russia to some
degree. In addition to these two groups, there is Iraqi Kurdish group that
swings between these two main camps in a pendulum way in order to save its
territory and possibly achieve its own final objective i.e. the Formation of an
Independent Kurdish State
in an appropriate time somewhere in the future. Whether the members of these
two heterogeneous camps are formally, informally, directly and indirectly cooperating
or coordinating with each other or not, all of them are pursuing a common goal at
the present time and that is: degrading, defeating and destroying ISIS in Iraq
as well as in Syria in the short term. In other words, there is some type of
unwritten and informal coexistence between these two heterogeneous camps at this
stage.
This unwritten
and informal coexistence might continue for a while, but it would not last in
the long term. The problem would probably arise, when these two heterogeneous
camps would try to achieve its own long term objectives in Iraq as well as in Syria. For example, the coalition
would try to build and form an inclusive, neutral, independent and sustainable
political system in Iraq.
On the contrary, Iran would
try to impose and preserve its own hegemony in Iraq. Ditto for Syria. The coalition would try to
overthrow Assad’s Regime in the long term by supporting the moderate Syrian
opposition in different terms. On the contrary, Iran,
Hezbollah and Russia
would try to preserve Assad’s Regime. To put it simply, the long term interests
of two heterogeneous camps would inevitably crisscross at some multiple levels
in both Iraq and Syria somewhere
in the future. This issue would cause a serious additional conflict for the
coalition. This conflict, in addition, would intensify the level of tension between
Sunni and Shiite groups beyond the territorial borders of Iraq and Syria
in various parts of the Middle East.
3-2- The second issue to mention is
with regard to the formation of a unity, inclusive and more importantly an
independent and sustainable political system in Iraq, as clearly mentioned above.
This is a perfect idea; but is this goal achievable in current Iraq? The
answer to this question is almost negative, due to the fact that the current
Iraqi society suffers from a deep and broad chronic anomaly in terms of “identity”.
Although the despotic behavior of Saddam’s Regime in this matter could not be
ignored, but the root cause of this problem goes mainly back to the First Gulf
War in 1991; when the coalition led by the USA informally divided Iraq into
three Kurdish, Sunni, and Shiite areas by creating two No-Fly zones in the
North and South of the country.
This event
weakened the overall power of Saddam’s Regime in the country on the one hand
and on the other hand, it facilitated a good opportunity for different external
actors to be involved in the domestic affairs of Iraq by supporting various
religious and ethnic groups in order to overthrow then-the Iraqi Regime as soon
as possible. This mission was, finally, accomplished following the 2003 U.S.
invasion In Iraq. Among those external actors that were directly or indirectly
involved in Iraq, the
Iranian Regime became the final winner following the total withdrawal of U.S.
troops from this country in 2011. Such historical disorders have cultivated and
nurtured the seed of religious and ethnic fragmentation within the Iraqi
society. Over time (more than two decades), this fragmentation has become much
deeper and broader and accordingly has changed the mentality of majority of
people in Iraq.
As a result, the
majority of the Iraqi people including the politicians do not identify
themselves as a unified Iraqi nation; instead, they are defining themselves in
a religious and ethnic category of Shiite, Sunni and Kurdish groups. In other
words, religious and ethnic origins have become the main and important identity
for most of the Iraqi people. After nearly two and half decades, this attitude
has been internalized and institutionalized in various parts of the Iraqi
society from top to the bottom. To put it simply, we are witnessing a type of
severe religious and ethnic nepotism in current Iraq. There are different examples,
which confirm this statement. Among these examples, the conflict between Shiite
Prime Minister Al-Maleki and the Sunni Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi, the dispute between Shiite Al-Maleki and
Masoud Barzani the President of Iraqi Kurdistan region, the continuously
increasing numbers of sectarian violence between Shiite and Sunni groups across
the country in the last couple of years and the point that the Kurdish
Pishmerga forces are fighting ISIS only in the Kurdish region of Iraq, could be
mentioned. The combination of all these examples and alike clearly show how
dangerously and deeply the Iraqi society has been fragmented. Performing Capacity Building
in a country like Iraq
with such a historical anomaly at this chaotic stage especially by the help or
force of the external actors is a very difficult task. This anomaly might not
cause a serious problem at this stage, due to the fact that all of the Shiite,
Sunni and Kurdish groups are pursuing a common goal and that is defeating and
destroying their first and important enemy ISIS. Or we might say, they have no other
choice at the present time.
This unintentionally
cooperative condition would continue between these three groups for a while; but
it would not last in the long term. The bloody struggle of power between theses
religious and ethnic groups would begin, as soon as the main enemy i.e. ISIS would be destroyed. In such a chaotic environment in
Iraq,
the Iranian Regime has the upper hand in comparison with other regional
external actors based on many reasons as follows.
3-2-1- The Kurdish and Shiite groups
are two strong and well-organized factions in Iraq, which both of them are
completely functioning under the control and supervision of the Iranian Regime.
3-2-2- The common border with Iraq would give a good opportunity to the
Islamic Regime to easily transfer its force and resources into Iraq
at any moment, if it is needed.
3-2-3- The existence of some Shiite
holy cities such as Karbala, Samarra, and Kadhimiya in Iraq would offer Iran a
good opportunity to agitate many Shiite People around the world and mobilize
them into Iraq, if it is necessary.
3-2-4- The Iranian Regime has done many
efforts and has spent billions of dollars throughout the past 35 years in order
to have a free highway from its geographical territory to the border of Israel
through Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. This important mission has been successfully
accomplished despite many challenges. Therefore, it is hard to believe that Iran would
easily lose such a strategic and important accomplishment.
As such, it
would seem to be a far-fetched idea that a unity, inclusive and independent
political system would govern Iraq
somewhere in the near future. This is a bitter truth that since 2003 onward Iraq was, is and will be a failed state for many
years to come; unless a reliable, democratic and secular political system would
take the power in Iraq
and change the mentality of the people in a professional, appropriate and
sustainable manner. In short, an Iraq under the control and
supervision of the Iranian Regime would disrupt Obama’s plan to some degree
somewhere in the future.
3-3- The third issue to mention is with
regard to other part of Obama’s plan, which is supposed to be performed against
ISIS structure within the Syrian territory. As
noted above, the plan is apparently pursuing two short and long term goals in Syria. In the
short term, the coalition would launch a series of air strikes against ISIS targets. In addition, the coalition would
reorganize, train, arm and equip the moderate Syrian opposition in the long
term. The first steps of this part of Obama’s plan have already started. On
Monday, 22.09.2014, the position and structure of ISIS
in Raqqa province were bombed and targeted by the coalition’s fighter jets and
tomahawk missiles. The U.S.,
Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain and United Arabs Emirate
forces were the only participants in this joint operation. Although, the U.S.
administration had repeatedly announced that the coalition would not seek any
coordination and cooperation with Assad’s Regime in this matter, some news
published by The New York Times and Asriran (An Iranian news agency) website reveals
something completely contradictory. According to this news, the Syrian
ambassador to the United Nations and the Iranian Regime were informed about
this operation in advance by the U.S. authority. The military
operation in Syria drew
mixed reactions from authorities in Tehran, Moscow and Damascus.
Both President Rouhani and President Putin criticized the operation in Syria
and claimed that the operation was illegal due to the fact that it did not have
the approval of the Syrian government. Contrary to these claims, the Syrian
authority welcomed the military operation in a tolerable and acceptable manner
(JCS, 2014, Nytimes, 2014, Asriran, 2014).
Regarding the
military operation in Syria,
the Syrian Foreign Ministry stated:
“The government “backs any international
effort that contributes to the fight against terrorists,” whether it is the
Islamic State, the Nusra Front “or anyone else” (Nytimes,
2014).
As this official
statement defines, Assad’s Regime has apparently decided to follow the rally of
anti-ISIS at this stage; even though, the military operation against this
terrorist group would be conducted on its territory. Choosing this tactical
move raises some important questions as follows. 1- What is/are the reason/s
behind this tactical move of Assad’s Regime? 2- Would Assad’s Regime use this
tactical move in the long term as well? With respect to the first question,
some speculations could be mentioned. By choosing this tactical move at this
stage, the Syrian Regime is probably pursuing two main propaganda and strategic
goals. When it comes to the propaganda goal, by this move: A- Assad’s Regime
would try to demonstrate that it is against any Islamic fundamentalist and
terrorist groups. B- The Syrian Regime would try to increase its legitimacy and
attract the public opinion in the domestic as well as in international arena.
C- The Regime would try to ease the tension with some of its enemies. Should
this happen, Assad’s Regime might be able to cause a fragmentation between the
group of its enemies.
When it comes to
the strategic goal, the Syrian Regime is probably using “Buck Passing Strategy”
by this move. In this case, Assad’s Regime would try to remain on the sideline,
at least for a while, and let its enemies (i.e. the coalition forces and ISIS fighters) use their resources against each other. Using
the Buck Passing Strategy in this particular case i.e. war against some
terrorist groups such as ISIS or Al-Nusra
Front and alike might have an additional and unexpected benefit for Assad’s
Regime as well (I emphasize; it might have). One might wonder how? As we know
some terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda, ISIS, Al-Nusra Front, Al-Shebab, Boko
Haram and alike do not have any respect at all for the domestic as well as international
laws and conventions. These terrorist groups perform any inhuman and cruel
activity in order to achieve their barbaric objectives no matter when or where
or how. In the case of direct military confrontation between the coalition and
ISIS, some members of another terrorist group based in some other countries
(e.g. somewhere in North Africa or Asia), might decide to perform a retaliatory
terrorist attack within the EU, or the USA
or somewhere else in the world in solidarity with ISIS;
something like the 9/11 attack. Such an incident would inevitably divert the
mind and attention of the international community from Syria to
somewhere else, as the event of 9/11 did. As a result, the case of removing
Bashar Assad from the power would automatically fade, at least for a while. Although,
the probability of such an incident is very low, but this is an important
issue, which should neither be ignored nor underestimated. In short, this
tactical move is beneficial for Assad’s Regime at the present time.
The second
question was: would Assad’s Regime use this tactical move in the long term? The
answer to this question is negative. Simply, because the long term will and
interest of Assad’s Regime and the coalition would finally clash with each
other at some point somewhere in the future. The coalition would try to destroy
ISIS and simultaneously empower the moderate
Syrian opposition in different terms. By this move, the coalition would try to
pave the way for the moderate opposition to gradually weaken and finally
overthrow Assad’s Regime from the power. This move is unpleasant and unacceptable
not only for Assad’s Regime but also for its close allies Russia and Iran. In case of such an event, the
military confrontation between the coalition forces and Assad’s Regime would inevitably
begin.
Should this
happen, Iran and Russia would undoubtedly be involved in this
battle and fully support the Syrian Regime from different angles; simply
because Syria
plays a vital role for both of them. Russia
has nearly $ 4.5 billion dollars economic trade with Syria annually. In addition to this
economic reason, Syria plays
an important role for Russia
in terms of strategic and geopolitical matters. Ditto for Iran and its affiliate Hezbollah in Lebanon.
In case of such a military confrontation, Russia
might be smart and do not deploy its ground forces to Syria. But the
country would, undoubtedly, arm Assad’s Regime with the most advance and
high-tech weapons. This might not be the end of the story. In
retaliation, Russia might use all its leverages including the ethnic Russian residents in the Baltic States and destabilize the Eastern part of the EU in different term. When it comes to Iran,
the coalition forces would highly likely clash with IRGC, Quds forces, Hezbollah
fighters and other Shiite groups not only in Syria
but also in Iraq
as well. In case of continuation, this military confrontation would spread to
other vulnerable parts of the Middle East as
well. Among these vulnerable areas, Bahrain,
Yemen, and Lebanon could
be mentioned. Such a conflicutual environment would facilitate a fertile land
in the entire Middle East for all radical
Islamic groups. From this point the production and reproduction of new Islamic
terrorist groups would begin in the region. This simply means: opening a new
Pandora’s Box in the entire Middle East and possibly in North
Africa (Sirani, 2013).
This is not the
end of story in Syria.
Obama’s plan would face an additional obstacle in the long term with regard to
the Syrian opposition. According to the plan, the coalition would try to
empower the Moderate Syrian opposition in different terms. This part of the
plan is questionable from different angles as follows. A- How are these
moderate oppositions? B- Are these moderate groups are organized and united? C-
Have these moderate groups enough power and leverage (in terms of quality and
quantity) to dismantle other radical Islamist groups in Syria in the
short and long term? D- What does the Obama administration mean by the term
“Moderate”? (I pose this question because I have heard some of the U.S. And EU officials call some presidents such as
Mohammad Khatami, Hassan Rouhani and Mohamed Morsi the moderate people).
It would be wise
that the U.S.
administration would focus on these questions in an appropriate and serious manner;
because, there are many rumors and complex issues with regard to the Syrian
oppositions. In this respect, two important points could be mentioned. The
first point to mention is a rumor, which indicates that some groups within the
Syrian opposition have signed a non-violence pact with ISIS.
The second point to mention is about the large numbers of the Syrian opposition
groups. As ambassador R.S. Ford (former U.S. ambassador to Syria 2010-2014)
states, there are nearly 1500 groups within the Syrian opposition. Some of
these groups consist of three, four or five person and some others might have
couple of thousands fighters. What does this statement mean? Doesn’t this
statement show how fragmented the Syrian opposition groups are? Doesn’t this
statement indicate that there is a serious struggle of power between the Syrian
opposition groups? And finally: Does the Obama administration want to create a
chaotic Syria in the long
term; something like current situation in Libya? (C-span, 2014).
Conclusion:
This was a brief
analysis about Obama’s plan and some of its consequences in the short and long
term. As explored in this essay, the plan might be able to destroy ISIS in Iraq as well as in Syria; but the long term objectives
of this plan would face a series of obstacles in different terms. These
obstacles would intensify the level of conflict and spread the wave of tension
in different parts of the Middle East beyond the territorial borders of Iraq and Syria. As I analyze this plan from
different angles, I come to the conclusion that there is no light at the end of
the tunnel of Obama’s strategy. In fact, the plan might open a new Pandora’s
Box, which its negative side effects would drag different parts of the Middle East into a series of unnecessary, useless and
endless conflict for many years to come. Such a conflicutual environment in Iraq and other parts of the Middle
East might be likely beneficial only for one group of people in
the region and that is the Kurdish people. Such a broad tension in the region
would inevitably intensify the formation of an independent Kurdish State
in North Iraq.
In sum, my
prediction is that the U.S.
administration is pursuing another important long term goal in the Middle East,
much more than defeating ISIS. The U.S. is trying to show its iron fist to Iran, Russia
and Syria.
By performing this plan, the U.S.
would try to fundamentally demolish the expansionist presence of Iran and Russia
and kick them out of Iraq
and Syria.
In case of such an event, the U.S.
and its allies would achieve multilateral objectives.
1- The U.S. would once again impose its hegemony on the
entire Middle East. 2- The U.S. and its
allies (the Arab states) would be able to provide the necessary source of
energy (oil and gas) for the EU. This event would be possible in two ways: a
pipeline might pass through Iraq
and Syria or might pas
through Iraq and Turkey and goes
to the EU. By such a move, the EU would be independent from Russia in terms
of energy. As a result, the U.S.
and EU would be able to put an extra pressure on Russia
in different terms including with regard to the current tension in Ukraine. 3-
Such a move would inevitably weaken the Islamic Regime of Iran in the Middle East as well. That’s why the Arab States have
participated in this operation with full enthusiasm and eagerness. 4- In case
of such an event, the U.S.
and its European allies might be able to put an extra pressure on Iran
with regard to its adventurous nuclear activity. As an ordinary Iranian in
exile, i’m totally against the Iranian Regime, but I hope my prediction would be
wrong in this matter; because, the consequences of such a move would be
devastating for all the people in the Middle East.
In the final part of this essay two additional points should be mentioned. The first point is the reaction of some western politician and scholar, who suggest that the U.S. and Iran should coordinate and cooperate with each other in this battle. I'm wondering based on what reasonable and logical foundation these people bravely declare such a statement in the public. With regard to the second point, I remind the U.S. administration to a simple but
meaningful and famous sentence, which says: Starting a war is a simple task for every statesman; it can be easily
done by firing a single bullet from a simple pistol. But achieving the
objective and ending a war as quickly as possible is an extremely important
task that not every statesman can do.
M. Sirani
25.09.2014
References:
Asriran (2014). The U.S.
had informed Iran
in advance.
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (2004). The Bush Administration's Doctrine of
Preemption (and Prevention): When, How, Where?
Accessed on: 19.09.2014.
C-SPAN (2014). U.S.
Strategy Against Terrorists.
JOINT CHIEFS OF
STAFF (2014). Dempsey Discusses Anti-ISIL Strategy at Senate Hearing.
Obama, B. (2014). Obama’s speech to the nation.
Sirani, M.
(2013). An assessment about the current civil war in Syria.
The New York
Times (2014). Obama, in Speech on ISIS, Promises Sustained Effort to Rout Militants.
The New York
Times (2014). In Airstrikes, U.S.
Targets Militant Cell Said to Plot an Attack Against the West.
Vox (2014).
Experts: Obama’s legal justification for the war on ISIS
is “a stretch”.
