As it appears the nuclear negotiation between 5+1 and Iran has reached a new critical point. As far as i know, both sides are disagree on some issues including:
1- Heavy Water Nuclear Facility in Arak.
2- Visiting Parchin facility; a military base that IAEA suspects that Iran has done some nuclear test over there
3- A full and comprehensive Additional Protocol, which gives IAEA inspectors unlimited and unexpected access to all Iran's nuclear facilities at any time.
4- Iran's Missile Development Program.
5- Development of New types of Nuclear Centrifuges (High speed).
In this respect, some observations are in order.
1- Iran might apparently agree to change the Heavy Water reactor to a Light Water reactor in Arak Nuclear Facility.
2- The chance that Iran would give permission to IAEA inspectors to visit Parchin Facility is honestly very low; unless Iran would be sure that it has perfectly cleaned this Facility in a way that IAEA inspectors would not find any evidence against Iran.
3- About Additional Protocol, Iran might agree to accept it finally. But, there is a serious question in this matter. Can the IAEA or the international community trust Iran? The answer to this question is also negative. An example, which confirms my statement is a new report, which claims that Iran has been hiding Plutonium in the special metal pipes.
4- In terms of Missile Development program, i have to say that Iran would never accept such an deal specially at this stage with the West. Such a deal with Iran might be possible in one occasion and that is that Iran has obtained nuclear weapon. In that case, Iran might agree to sign a agreement such as The New START Treaty with the West plus a strong international legally binding confirmation that the West would never militarily attack Iran.
M. Sirani 14.05.2014
For those, who are interested, i re-upload my previous essay in this matter here below.
Will the US attack Iran?
Mehran Sirani 01.11.2012
Introduction:
Iran’s nuclear activity is one of
the main topics of discussion amongst most politicians around the globe. This
issue has generated enormous fear and uncertainty amongst some policy makers,
particularly amongst those officials in the strategic region of the Middle
East. In response, Iran continuously insists that the nature of its nuclear activity
is peaceful and the country does not have any plan to build a nuclear weapon.
On the other hand, after many years’ efforts, still the IAEA has not been able
to verify the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear activity, due to the lack of full
control and access to all Iran’s nuclear plants and programmes. Consequently, so
far, the US and the EU have enforced severe diplomatic pressure and enormous
economic sanctions on Iran. However, despite all these hard pressures, Iran not
only has not stopped or reduced its nuclear activities; instead, it has
intensified its nuclear programmes at one of its underground nuclear facilities
i.e. Fordo. The combination of all these issues has made Iran’s nuclear
activity more suspicious and dubious. It seems that Iran is moving towards building
a nuclear weapon. This is something that is unacceptable for most of the
countries around the world including the US. Regarding Iran’s nuclear activity,
there are two general opinions amongst most of the people. The first group believes
that the current situation is very critical and Iran would finally stop its
nuclear activity. The second group argues that Iran would not halt its nuclear
activity and the country is trying to acquire the nuclear weapon. In response
to the first group, we can argue, if Iran stops its nuclear activity, then the
problem has been solved. Regarding the premise of the second group then, we are
facing a serious question as follows: will the US attack Iran? This paper will
attempt to find a convincing answer to this important question (Aei, 2012; Sirani,
2012).
1- Literature Review:
In this paper, I would try to find a
reasonable answer to the question of will the US attack Iran or not. Here below
are the lists of literatures, which I find relevant and helpful to this topic.
1.1. Beginning with R. Jackson & G. Sørensen’s
book “Introduction to International Relations: Theories & Approaches 4th
EDITION” which is a comprehensive book about different theoretical
approaches within IR studies. In some chapters, the authors explain different
IR theoretical subjects within the frame of a historical event. This method
helps the reader to understand the IR theoretical subjects easily and with more
accuracy. Personally, I recommend this book to every IR student. However, In
order to analyze the possibility of this war, I use Yetiv’s theoretical framework in the chapter 9 (P. 225-248), titled “Foreign
Policy” within this book.
1.2. When it comes to analyzing the different issues
about war and various types of philosophy of war, I think the book titled “SECURITY
STUDIES: AN INTRODUCTION” 2e, edited by Paul D. Williams is a fascinating and
useful book. The book consists of 37 chapters and all of them are relevant to
different subjects within security studies. This book is also a comprehensive
book and necessary for every IR student to read. In order to identify different
types of philosophy of war in my paper, I use the chapter 13 (P. 187-205),
titled “War” within this book.
1.3. In order to analyze some other issues related
to war, I use the chapter 12 (P. 210-224), titled “The changing character of
war” written by M. Sheehan, within the book titled “THE GLOBALIZATION OF
THE WORLD POLITICS: An introduction to international relations”, 4e, edited
by J. Baylis, S. Smith, P. Owens. This book consists of 32 chapters, which all
of them are relevant to important theoretical approaches and subjects within IR
studies.
1.4. In order to analyze the ideological
characteristic of the Islamic Regime, I use two religious websites of Eteghad
and Al-Shia. Some details in these websites are necessary for those who want to
know more about Shia branch of Islam.
2-
Methodology:
All details in this paper were
limited to secondary data derived from various books, articles, and internet resources
relevant to this topic. I used desk study technique for my analysis in this
paper. Through this process, i reviewed and examined the necessary information
relevant to this topic. This paper is organized as follows: The first part examines
the question of will the US attack Iran or not within Yetiv’s framework. This part consists of three separate sections and each section examines
the main question of this paper separately within different models. The second
part is a brief analysis about the reliability of Yetiv’s framework. The third part evaluates the mindset of policy
makers in Iran. The fourth part examines the reaction of the US. The final part
is conclusion.
3-
Main Discussion: Will the U.S. attack Iran?
In order to find a reasonable answer to this question, we
need to have some knowledge about the mindset of decision maker in the US. In
other words, how would the U.S. policy makers perceive the current nuclear dispute
with Iran? In doing so, it would be helpful to use a theoretical framework,
which has been introduced by Steve A. Yetiv in 2004. Through this framework,
Yetiv has analyzed the main causes of the US invasion to Iraq in 2003. Although,
there are many differences between that war and current tension between the US
and Iran in different terms, but this framework, to some extent might help us
to find a convincing answer to our main question. However, Yetiv’s framework consists of
three theoretical models, which all of them should be examined parallel to each
other and simultaneously. These theoretical models include 1- The Rational
Actor Model (RAM), 2- the Groupthink Model and 3- the Cognitive Model (Figure
1) (Jackson & Sørensen, 2010).
Figure 1: Yetiv’s framework
for analyzing the possibility of a war (Jackson
& Sørensen, 2010).
3.1. The Rational Actor
Model (RAM):
The main structure of the RAM model is based on realist
point of view. According to this model, the anarchic nature of the
international system forces states to rely on self-help, in order to achieve
and protect their national security and interest. In the anarchical
international system, a state, based on rational choice would go to war, if it
recognizes that its vital national security or interests are in jeopardy. Thus,
in the international system: war is always a possibility. With this brief
explanation, let us examine the possibility of the US war against Iran within
the RAM model. So far, the nuclear activities of Iran have been causing many
tension and uncertainty in the international arena, particularly in the
strategic region of the Middle East.
The US (i.e. policy makers in the USA) knows that a nuclear-armed Iran would dramatically change the balance of power in the
Middle East. Such change in the first place, would weaken and threaten the superiority-security
of Israel as the US closest ally in the region. On the other hand, a
nuclear-armed Iran would also threaten the security of some other oil-rich states
including Saudi Arabia in the Gulf area. This event, as a result, would accelerate
a nuclear arms race amongst other states in the Middle East. Such a nuclear
arms race in an area, which supplies large amount of oil and gas to the rest of
the world would automatically threaten the global economy too (Jackson & Sørensen, 2010; Nti, 2012; Sirani, 2012).
This brief explanation shows that the RAM model faces a
serious dilemma. On the
one hand, as we know, most of the realist scholars including Kenneth Waltz are
the proponents of a nuclear-armed Iran idea. These scholars claim that a
nuclear-armed Iran would create the balance of power between Israel and Iran in
the Middle East. As a result, this issue would promote peace and stability in
the region. From this point of view, based on the RAM model, we can deduce that
the US would not attack Iran. However, on the other hand, a nuclear-armed Iran
would lead the Middle Eastern countries towards a nuclear arms race. This event,
consequently, would threaten the national security-interest of not only the
oil-rich states in the Middle East but also other
countries around the globe, which are dependent on oil, and gas of this region (Jackson & Sørensen, 2010; Pbs, 2012).
Moreover, there is tremendous fear about
the growing activities of fundamentalist non-state actors such as Al-Qaida in
the region and access of these fanatic groups to any types of weapons of mass
destruction including nuclear weapon. This is also a crucial issue for most
politicians in the world including the policy makers in the US. If, for
instance, Iran obtains nuclear weapons and after a while, this political system
would face a serious political turmoil, some radical Islamic non-state actor or
some fundamentalist faction within this political system might have access to the
nuclear bomb in the country. In this case, what would happen? How would the
international community be able to control this nuclear-armed fundamentalist group?
The combination of all these issues, would automatically threaten the national
security and interest of the US and its close allies in the region. In this
case, based on the RAM model, we can conclude that the US would attack Iran, in
order to protect the national security-interest of itself and its close allies
in the Middle East. As illustrated above, the RAM model faces a serious dilemma and gives us two contradictory
outcomes of negative and positive conclusions about the possibility of this war (Jackson
& Sørensen, 2010; Pbs, 2012).
3.2.
The Groupthink Model:
This model focuses on the mindset
and perception of small group of advisors, who their opinions to some extent
would influence the process of decision making for war. These advisors (Think
Tanks) might work in the private sector, some government bureaus, university
departments or some public institutions. This group of advisor provides useful
information and consultation on different international issues for states. We
should bear in mind, that any miscalculation or misperception in these advices,
could lead the process of decision making towards an unnecessary and
devastating war. The US invasion of Iraq in 2003 would be a clear example of such
erroneous decision. Regarding that war (2003), Yetiv claims that a small group
of advisors mistakenly convinced President Bush that the economic sanctions against
Saddam’s regime would not function anymore. As a result, the president Bush
approved an unnecessary and costly war against Iraq without any further consultation
even with some of his experienced staffs including C. Powell and N. Schwarzkopf
(Jackson & Sørensen, 2010).
Based on some reasons, analyzing the
possibility of the US war against Iran within this particular model, would be difficult
too. One of the main reasons is the broad range of foreign policy advisers with
different IR theoretical thinking within Obama’s administration. The simultaneous
presence of some leading realist figures such as Z. Brzezinski and B. Scowcroft
and some liberal internationalists such as S. Rice and H. Clinton within this
administration portrays an image that it seems; Obama’s administration is
swinging between realism and liberal internationalism approaches in terms of its
foreign policy. This bipolarity makes our analysis within this model a little
bit more difficult. Consequently, we are left with some unanswered questions
including: who would be the main and final advisor/advisors regarding
this war? Would these advisors have a realist or liberalist understanding about
the international system? Which one of these approaches would be the dominant
idea in the final stage of the decision-making? (Antiwar, 2012; Jackson & Sørensen, 2010).
3.3.
The Cognitive Model:
This model focuses on the individual
key decision-maker, in this case the President Obama, who can profoundly change
the course of the decision-making process regarding this issue. In order to
analyze the possibility of the US war against Iran within this model, we need
to find reasonable answers to some questions including: How does Obama perceive
the current tension with Iran? Does Obama use any historical analogy regarding
this war? What kind of images does Obama have about this tension? Are these
images derived from accurate information through an authentic source or are
mixed by fake and bias information? Answering these questions is not also an
easy task, because it requires some confidential information, which unfortunately
is beyond our access and authority (Jackson
& Sørensen, 2010).
The lack of such confidential
information limits the scope of our analysis within this model. This issue
compels us to rely on some information about Obama, which we have observed in
the past four years of his presidency. In this case, we can argue that there
are two different images from Obama. On the one hand, Obama is a president
that:
“He has racked up some
notable successes, including significantly weakening al Qaeda, effectively
managing relations with China, rebuilding the United States' international
reputation, resetting the relationship with Russia and ratifying the New
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), achieving a UN Security Council
resolution imposing harsh sanctions on Iran, completing overdue but welcome
free-trade accords, and withdrawing U.S. troops from Iraq” (Foreignaffairs, 2012).
Based on this statement, Obama is a liberal
internationalist. From this characteristic, we can deduce that Obama would prefer
to solve the current nuclear dispute with Iran through a diplomatic and
peaceful manner. On the other hand, we have seen another face of Barack Obama,
which to some extent undermines the previous deduction. Obama’s hasty reaction
to Hosni Mubarak, the former Egyptian president, and the US military intervention
in Libya that led to
regime change in this country portray another image about Obama. From these
examples, we can assume that Obama has some tendency towards liberal
interventionism approach too. However, whether Obama is a liberal
internationalist or a liberal interventionist or combination of both these
approaches, we should bear in mind some important points. Firstly, these
different approaches do not mean that Obama will continue to this diplomatic
struggle with Iran in an infinite period; since every diplomatic effort, even a
diplomatic marathon type (i.e. a long-term negotiation) has a time limitation,
particularly when it comes to sensitive and crucial issue like the nuclear
weapon. Secondly, these approaches do not signify that Obama would always solve
every tension in a peaceful and diplomatic manner. Regarding Iran’s nuclear
activity, Obama has clearly expressed his opinion in different occasions and
publicly announced that, the US prefers to solve the nuclear dispute with Iran
through a diplomatic manner, but all of the options including the military
action are still on the table. Moreover, recently, Obama has strongly emphasized
that the clock is ticking and as long as he is the president, he would not
allow Iran to obtain the nuclear weapon. Thirdly and in addition to all
explained above, we should also bear in mind this part of M. Doyle’s statement,
when he claims: “Liberal democracies are as aggressive as any other type
of state in their relations with authoritarian regimes and state less peoples” (Jackson & Sørensen, 2010; Nytimes, 2012; Dune, 2008, p.113).
3.4. The Summary of Yetiv’s Framework:
In
the last three sections, we have tried to find a convincing answer to our main
question within Yetiv’s framework. Through this framework, we have examined the
possibility of this war within three separate theoretical models. The result of
its RAM model led us towards two contradictory negative and positive
conclusions about the occurrence of this war. The results of two other analyses
of the groupthink and cognitive models also could not give us a concrete and
precise answer about the possibility of this war, due to the lack of access to
some confidential information within Obama’s administration. However, in
general, the results of Yetiv’s framework bring us to some important
points. Firstly, it indicates that a nuclear-armed Iran to some degree would
threaten the national security and interest of the US and its close allies in
the Middle East. In other words, if Iran would not agree to stop its secret and
mysterious nuclear activities, there would be some possibility that the US will
attack Iran (Jackson & Sørensen, 2010).
Secondly and more generally, Yetiv’s framework might
have been helpful in case of analyzing the US invasion to Iraq in 2003, but it cannot
be a universal and comprehensive theoretical tool to use by every analyzer
(with all respect to Yetiv) in every case study; due to some complications in
its groupthink and cognitive models. As illustrated above, these two models can
be examined properly, only by those analyzers who have access to some confidential
and secret information, in our case study, within Obama’s administration. The
lack of such important information undermines the accuracy and efficiency of Yetiv’s
framework. This shortage of knowledge, as a result, creates extra complication
for us. For example, in the current situation, there are some important events
going on in the international arena. Each one of these events to some extent
might increase or on the contrary, decrease the possibility of this war; but
within Yetiv’s framework, we
cannot evaluate them. The current global economic stagnation is one of these
events. Within this framework, we cannot analyze, whether the current global
economic stagnation would be a driving force towards this war, or on the
contrary, this issue would prevent the war. The second event is ongoing severe
civil war in Syria as one of Iran’s closest allies in the Middle East. Within
this framework, again we cannot figure out whether this issue would increase
the possibility of this war or not? Although, analyzing the effect of current
economic stagnation on the possibility of this war is beyond the scope and
format of this paper, but the recent conflict in Syria is an important issue,
which should not be overlooked. In order to find out how current tension in
Syria might increase or decrease the possibility of this war, we should turn
our attention to the mindset of policy makers in Iran. In other words, what is
the final goal of policy makers in Iran? How would the policy makers in Iran
perceive the current tension in Syria? The next section shall analyze these issues.
4- The Mindset of Policy
Makers in Iran:
The ideological
foundation of the Islamic Republic of Iran is based on the Shia branch of Islam.
The Shia Muslims in Iran (Mostly Twelver) are the followers of the twelve
descendants of the Prophet Mohammad. According to Shia mythology, some three
centuries after the death of the Prophet Mohammad, the twelfth Imam (Mahdi) went
into an indefinite period of occultation. The fundamental belief of Shia branch
is as follows: when the world is full of injustice, inequality, and violence, Imam
Mahdi will return and fill the world with justice and prosperity for all people,
through the establishment of an Islamic state on Earth. Based on this
theological doctrine, the Islamic Regime has been trying to expand its influence
and hegemony beyond its own geographical borders, particularly in the Middle
East. This religious expansion is a celestial duty for the Islamic Regime and it
pursues a sacred goal: the establishment of a Shia Empire in the region. Two of
the most important functions of this Shia Empire would be as follows: 1- It would
facilitate the advent of Imam Mahdi and 2- It would provide the necessary assistance
and support to Imam Mahdi, when he will return from occultation. Iran precisely
knows that the achievement of such a divine and important goal without the
nuclear weapon is almost impossible. This is the main reason behind Iran’s
nuclear activities. However, different evidences indicate the fact that
recently despite enormous diplomatic pressure and severe economic sanctions,
Iran not only has not reduced its uranium enrichment programmes, instead it has
accelerated its nuclear activities, for example at Fordo underground facility
near Qom city (Afshari, 2011; Aei, 2012; Sirani, 2012; Eteghad, 2012).
This issue
raises a serious question. Why Iran does not halt or reduce its nuclear
activity, despite all these diplomatic and economic sanctions? The answer to
this question has direct connection with current civil war in Syria and Shia
group uprising in Yemen. As we know, from early days of the Islamic Revolution,
the policy makers in Iran have been trying to hold a durable, solid, and close
tie with Syrian regime. This close relationship between Tehran and Damascus can
be understood partly within the concept of a stronger strategic partnership
against Israel. However, this is not the whole story; since, there is some
other important reason beyond this inseparable strategic partnership. According
to different hadiths in Shia branch of Islam, the righteous movement in Yemen
and bloody civil war in Syria are amongst five events, which would occur before
or during the emergence of Imam Mahdi (Eteghad, 2012; Sirani, 2012).
According to one
of these hadiths:
“One example of the direct help that Imam Mahdi will receive from
Allah s.w.t. will be his defeat of Sufyaani. Sufyaani will be a man from the
family of Abu Sufyan, and he will emerge from Damascus and conduct a ruthless
campaign of bloodshed and mass killing, during which thousands of innocent
people will be slaughtered. He will be supported by the people of the tribe of
Kalb.
Sufyaani will dispatch his army to Mecca in order to destroy Imam Mahdi, however Imam Mahdi’s army will easily defeat Sufyaani’s army. Sufyaani will then lead a separate contingent of his remaining army to face Imam Mahdi himself. This army will subsequently be destroyed by an enormous earthquake at Baidaa on the road to Mecca” (Al-Shia, 2012).
Sufyaani will dispatch his army to Mecca in order to destroy Imam Mahdi, however Imam Mahdi’s army will easily defeat Sufyaani’s army. Sufyaani will then lead a separate contingent of his remaining army to face Imam Mahdi himself. This army will subsequently be destroyed by an enormous earthquake at Baidaa on the road to Mecca” (Al-Shia, 2012).
It seems
unrealistic for us, but this is the way that the policy makers in Iran perceive
the Shia uprising in Yemen and the current civil war in Syria. In fact, the
policy makers in Iran have a strong belief that currently, the Sufyaani army
(i.e. the Syrian Liberation Army and those states who support them) wants to
defeat Syrian regime and after that, this army will move to Mecca in order to
kill Imam Mahdi. Therefore, defending Assad’s regime would become a divine duty
for policy makers in Iran, which has to be fulfilled at the expense of
everything, in order to save Imam Mahdi. In fact, the combination of the
current civil war in Syria, Yemen and the Arab spring has portrayed an image in
the mind of religious policy makers in Iran that these rallies across the
Middle East arise from the chaos of the final war. In other words, according to
Shia mythology, we are close to the advent of Imam Mahdi or the Day of
Judgment. Thus, based on Shia eschatological philosophy, Iran should defeat its
enemies and establish a new world order; a new world without war, injustice and
inequality (Williams, 2013; Al-Shia, 2012; Eteghad, 2012).
This is an
important matter that most of the scholars and politicians do not pay attention
to it.
Based on all
explained above, we can deduce that Iran’s eschatological war, across the
Middle East including in Syria has begun. In the mind of policy makers in Iran,
this is the historical-religious moment that Iran should acquire the nuclear
bomb in order to accomplish its divine mission. Therefore, the chance that Iran
would stop or reduce its nuclear activities is very low. As a result, we can
expect that eventually, these diplomatic negotiations will also reach a dead end
somewhere in the future. In this case, there is high probability that the US
will attack Iran. The next section shall discuss this issue (Williams, 2013;
Sirani, 2012).
5- The Reaction of the US: (If
Obama wins re-election):
Obama knows that
a military strike on Iran would increase the price of oil and this event would consequently
deepen the global economic stagnation, at least for a while. Moreover, he does
not want to repeat the same mistake that his ancestor (former President Bush)
did and dragged the country into an unnecessary and costly war. Furthermore, he
is fully aware that there is ongoing political transformation in different
parts of the Middle East and a new war would generate more chaos and
instability in the region. On the other hand, a nuclear-armed Iran would threaten
the security of other states in the region and consequently would spark a nuclear
arms race in the Middle East. Such nuclear arms race would jeopardise not only the national
security but also the national interest (e.g. oil and gas) of the US and its
close allies in the region. This is a dangerous issue and a clear red line for
Obama, particularly, since most of the states in the Middle East to some extent
have been challenging by different radical Islamists non-state actors inducing
Al-Qaida. However, after a while, Obama will come to the final point that the costs of waiting for sanctions to function are
increasingly surpassing the benefits and the Islamic Regime is an intransigent regime, which cannot be trusted and
negotiated anymore. In this case, against his own will, Obama might go to war
against Iran
somewhere in the future (Jackson & Sørensen, 2010; Sirani, 2012).
Through this war, Obama will try to
minimize the threat of a nuclear-armed Iran in the Middle East. In fact, this
war will be an instrument for the US in order to achieve a political and
rational purpose; and that is to protect and maintain the national security and
interest of the US and its close allies in the Middle East. From this, we can
conclude that the US involvement and its perspective about this war will be
based on the political philosophy and understanding of war (Williams, 2013).
As Michael Sheehan also states:
“Wars are fought
for reasons. The Western understanding of war, following Clausewitz, sees it as
instrumental, a means to an end. Wars in this perspective are not random
violence; they reflect a conscious decision to engage in them for a rational
political purpose. They are rationalized by those who initiate them by appeal to
belief and values systems” (Sheehan, 2008, P. 214).
Conclusion:
In this essay, i tried to find a convincing answer to the
question of whether the US will attack Iran or not. In doing so, i used Yetiv’s
framework. Within this framework, i examined the possibility of this war within
three separate theoretical models. The result of its RAM model was a dual
negative and positive conclusion about the occurrence of this war. The results
of two other groupthink and cognitive models within this framework were also unclear
and uncertain, due to the lack of access to some important and confidential
information within Obama’s administration. These ambiguities compelled me to
turn my attention to the other actor of this tension i.e. Iran. My aim was to
find out how the policy makers in Iran perceive the current tension. The result
showed that there is some connection between the current tension in Syria and
Iran’s nuclear activities. Moreover, it showed that this connection stems from ideological
characteristic of the political system in Iran, which compels Iran to move
faster towards acquiring the nuclear weapon. From this, it can be concluded
that the chance that Iran would stop or reduce its nuclear activity is very
low. Consequently, this issue might force Obama to go to war against Iran . Through
this war, the US would try
to delay the Iranian
nuclear weapon programmes or possibly destroy the entire Iran Iran might not be able to compete militarily
with high technological military equipments of the US Iran
would carry out a proxy war in the whole Middle East
by using its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Ghods elite force and other Shiia
militia groups including Hezbollah. The second and important weapon of Iran is
the vulnerability of the Strait of Hormuz. Iran Iran has accumulated large amount of oil in the
fixed storage in the Khark Island (23 million barrels) and its floating oil
tankers in the Persian Gulf . Iran would easily
spill some amount of this oil in the Persian Gulf and burn them. In this way, Iran would be able to close the Strait of Hormuz , at least temporarily for a while. In
sum, the hostility between Iran
and the US will continue
more or less until the final days of the Islamic Regime in Iran
Mehran
Sirani 01.11.2012
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